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Chapter 3
Using Dashboards to Reach Acceptable Risk 
in Statistics Data Centers Through Risk 
Assessment and Impact Analysis
Atif Amin and Raul Valverde
Abstract A well designed and integrated database used to present risk manage-
ment information by using a dashboard interface supported by real time risk man-
agement data makes it easy for risk managers to reach a full understanding of the 
surrounding threats and allows them to find the proper and right controls to mitigate 
them. The chapter presents a case study for a statistics data center that shows that 
the calculation of total risk at the organization level is possible by using the pro-
posed risk database that supports decision makers when threats hit the organization. 
The chapter also shows that presenting the risk level on a dashboard viewer makes 
risk level clearer for a decision maker in a statistics data center and assists in the 
creation of a tool to follow-up risk management since the time a threat hits till the 
time of its mitigation.
 Introduction
In the modern world the term “Business without a Risk” does not exist (D’Souza 
and Valverde 2015); with the vast development of technology and science where 
businesses relies on information technology that depends on internet and unsecure 
network access, it is almost impossible to achieve total security as there will always 
be a breaches and vulnerabilities that threaten business and cause damages to inter-
est. Risk management becomes a necessity to every modern business, organization 
owners and decision makers implement it wildly to find hidden threats and 
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vulnerabilities in their electronic services and systems and to detect risk before its 
strike. Monitoring risk level is becoming a trend at every organization in order to 
protect their assets and interests (Nijburg and Valverde 2011) as early detection of 
threats would help security staff and risk analysts to build countermeasures and 
controls that can help to discover vulnerabilities over their systems and business 
(Wolden et al. 2015). With early detection of risk in organizations, this would give 
enough time to organizations in order to act and save their interests (Almadhoob and 
Valverde 2014).
A data center is a facility used to house computer systems and associated com-
ponents, such as telecommunications and storage systems. Although data centers 
has been readily adopted and implemented in commercial sectors such as the retail 
environment, its introduction and implementation for statistics purposes has been 
growing rapidly particular in the financial market and health care sectors (Khan and 
Valverde 2014).
The research focuses on conceptual understanding of information technology 
assets, how assets can be classified and categorized and how to be presented in a risk 
database for a statistics data center.This research primary focuses on designing and 
building a successful Information Security Management System (ISMS) module 
that can help statistics data centers the early detection of business risk. The following 
steps illustrate the scope of the research work:
 1. Categorize assets into tangible assets (hardware, software) and intangible (data, 
information, Services and company Image)
 2. Classify assets (assign access to applications and documents to different levels 
of management depending on who can access what and when).
 3. Group assets in types as (Hardware, Software, Data, Files, Services, Hard 
Documents… etc)
 4. Identify organization’s main services and related business processes
 5. Build a relationship between assets and business and store information in a rela-
tional database.
 6. Identify threats, vulnerabilities and possible impacts through risk assessments, 
history records, and literature.
 7. Create an automated Risk Assessment Plan (RAP) that allows the easy retrieval 
of risk information.
 8. A business continuity plan based on assets and risk treatment plan (RAP) and a 
risk mitigation plan.
 9. An ITIL assets management based framework (Assets Managements Database 
CMDB) for enhancing and maintaining Information security in statistics data 
centers.
The final result should lead to investigating risk causes using a dashboard viewer 
that will help IT managers to analyze results and establish proper controls to miti-
gate risk in statistics data centers.
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The study focuses on understanding risk components and their related threats over 
statistics data centers assets; in particular the study is going to explore in more detail 
the risk’s causes and reasons and will attempt to find solutions and controls to pro-
tect businesses. The following topics are reviewed:
• Assets






Identifying risk can be a very complex and hazard process when it comes to IT 
industry; one must develop an overall understanding of the business and the 
surrounding environment where every bit and pieces must count.
Common definitions are shared among related standards and researchers as 
follows:
• Risk is the likelihood of a threat agent taking advantage of vulnerability and the 
corresponding business impact (Harris 2008).
• Risk is the net negative impact of the exercise of vulnerability, considering both 
the probability and the impact of occurrence (Stoneburner et al. 2002)
• Risk is the combination of the probability of events and its consequences 
(ISO27001 standard)
• Risks can be defined as the probability of unwanted or unexpected event to occur
IT Systems and Services consist of many related components. In order to under-
stand this relationship we must identify these components and dependent entities. 
Breaking down the service or system into its components would ease the process of 
specifying assets hierarchy and levels. Components can be hardware, software, con-
nection while entities can be human, operation and organization image; all can be 
classified as assets. It is important to classify these assets and group them in catego-
ries and grade them. In order to clearly identify Risk levels, we need to assign a 
value to each asset, one of the key steps to perform a security risk assessment is to 
determine the value of the assets that require protection (Landoll 2006); this is the 
first step required by any risk assessment.
The second step is to look for surrounding threats and find their impact values over 
an asset (Landoll 2006). Impact can be severe causing total damage resulting in busi-
ness failure or can be acceptable and possible to live with (Stoneburner et al. 2002).







































Risk occurs when threats find their way to business infrastructure and environment 
and when vulnerability is exploited in order to allow threats to penetrate. 
Understanding threats and their probability of occurrence is important part of risk 
management. Measuring impact value on assets and finding its volume help to esti-
mate the amount of damage risk can produce.
Another important issue is to have a quick and fast mechanism to act against 
threats. Building a system that is intelligent enough to predict when the next impact 
might take place actually would help business owners to develop a disaster recovery 
action and improve their business continuity plans.
Risk management consists of three major processes (Landoll 2006):
 1. Risk Assessment: it identifies assets, threats and risk’s impacts and recommends 
measurements through setting controls.
 2. Risk Mitigation: the processes of accepting, avoiding or transferring risk
 3. Risk evaluation and Assessment: the process of ongoing risk evaluation
Achieving total security is impossible to reach; this issue has been the debate of 
many organizations especially those who are involved in military and government 
activates where security measurements are at the top of their priorities. It is not pos-
sible to provide total security against every single risk, but it is possible to provide 
effective security against most risks (Calder and Watkins 2008).
“No system or environment is 100 percent secure, which means there is always 
some risk left over to deal with” (Harris 2008). Residual Risk can be defined as 
“The values of risk remaining after security measures have been applied—namely, 
the risk that remains after mitigation (countermeasures) has been applied” (Kouns 
and Minoli 2010).
The Term Residual Risk is used as the acceptable level of threat that organization 
can bear and survives with. It is the acceptable level of threat organization must live 
with in case of no controls and measures are applied or cannot be applied.
To distinguish Residual Risk from Total Risk, Harris (2008) clarifies it in the 
next formula.
 
threats vulnerability asset value total risk
threats vulner
× × =
× ability asset value controlsgap residual risk×( )× =  
(1)
Harris (2008) also illustrates Residual Risk as:
 
threats,,vulnerability,andasset value total risk
total ri
( ) =
sk countermeasures residual risk– =  
(2)
Accepting part of risk is a process every organization must live with, it is only 
relevant to how much can be accepted. Sometimes the results of cost benefit analy-
ses indicates that the cost of countermeasures are higher and more expensive than 





































assets that needs to be protected which give the organization no choice but to live 
and accept this level of risk. Eventually the question that always rises is what degree 
of residual risk is acceptable to the organization. Organizations must set this level 
clearly after risk assessment in order to monitor and observe risk level.
 Asset’s Attributes for Risk Database
Assets are organization’s owned information, or any valuable entities that organi-
zation’s business depends on. They can also be defined as the property of organiza-
tion or person. In order to conduct an efficient risk assessment, a classification and 
categorization of assets are to be conceited and to be well identified. To build a 
solid design for a risk database many assets dependencies are to be well consid-
ered, identified and analyzed. An asset does not refer always to a tangible entity 
such as hardware or document but it can be none tangible as organization’s image, 
service or a process. It is quite important for the database design to define asset 
types and subtypes attributes.
Assets types can be as follows:
• Information Assets (electronic files, Data and manuals)
• Paper and hardcopy documents (contracts, Manuals, plans, agreements, 
correspondences)
• Software assets (applications, systems, codes, Operating Systems)
• Physical assets (Computers, Storages, Network Devices, Cables, RAKS, Power 
and Cooling Devices)
• People (technical staff, Customers and Clients)
Assets subtype (as proposed in risk database) can be a subcategory of Asset 
Types, an example of this:
 1. Physical asset (Server 004001)
 2. Physical asset (Firewall 004005)
 3. Information asset (Electronic File 001001)
Assets classification is the act of grouping assets into levels based on their sensi-
tivity and importance to organization. It is useful to categorize or classify assets to 
organize asset protection requirements, and the vulnerability assessment of assets 
(Landoll 2006). Some assets might be vital to certain organizations while they are 
not to others, also classification process can be changed with time, some assets 
might be top confidential at certain period of time while they can be public at other 
time. A proposal to win a contract that contains important financial data is very 
sensitive and classified through bidding while it can be worthless after the bid time 
is over.
Classification of assets depends on organization methodologies of how its scales 
and leverage its assets and it can be classified according to different levels. In order 
to manage and control access to assets, a level of accessibility need to be created 








































where it will govern who assess what. The business owner of an application (and 
any related data) must define who will have access to that application and, in terms 
of any data within it, at what level (i.e. read, write, delete, execute) (Calder and 
Watkins 2008).
Business applications and IT Systems usually consist of many interrelated assets 
working and communicating together to host business services. Applications like 
CRM and ERP solutions usually consist of databases, application and web servers 
and each hosts an operating system, applications and other software communicating 
though network and filtered by firewalls and network appliances and governed by 
network core switches via VLANs.
Failure of any asset item might put the service under risk. Some assets can be 
servers hosting software and data while others are communication channels allow-
ing this data to flow in and out. Eventually each is important to organization. We 
cannot say one is more important than other, but we definitely realize that losing 
data storage is more serious than losing communication between two ends, even 
though both will result in service failure.
To keep assets under observation and monitoring a good management procedure 
is required. In order to do this the following is to be considered:
• Storage repository to be used as inventory system for these assets. Asset manage-
ment includes knowing and keeping up-to-date this complete inventory of hard-
ware (systems and networks) and software (Harris 2008).
• To keep good track of assets Configuration Management Database (CMDB) and 
Assets inventory are to be synchronized in order to keep track of changes and 
incidents and vulnerabilities (Harris 2008).
• A well defined asset lifecycle and history process starting at requesting and pur-
chasing the asset and ending with assets termination or write-off.
Assets inventory is the source of Risk Management Systems for the determina-
tion of assets types, categories, classifications and values that would help to under-
stand their possible threat and eventually propose the proper control. Based on 
ISO27001 best practices information assets are to be well identified at risk assess-
ment. The asset inventory should identify each asset, including all the software, and 
describe it or provide such other identification that the asset can be physically iden-
tified (wherever possible, it makes sense to reuse whatever fixed asset number has 
already been allocated) and full details (including maker, model, generic type, serial 
number, date of acquisition and any other numbers) included in the inventory 
(Calder and Watkins 2008).
This process can be carried during risk assessment where result can always be 
compared with organization logistics register. On the other hand many configura-
tion management applications can provide similar information and can be consid-
ered as good source of Information Assets inventory.
Incident Management Systems Assets inventory can be a good source to Incident 
Management System where the last must be updates each time new assets are added, 
changed or removed.












































ITIL CMDB Information Technology Infrastructure Library’s Configuration 
Management Database is also a good example, it is a container and storage for most 
information assets used in incidents, change and configuration management. A Risk 
analyst can use assets information in these systems to evaluate risk assessment and 
load asset data to their processes. Assets historical information must be also stored 
and obtained in risk management database. Historical data can be very useful in 
term of understanding asset’s nature like age, value, relationship with other assets, 
and threats history with impacts. This can result in better evaluation and mitigation 
of risk.
Asset’s owners are Individuals (Organization staff) or Entities (department, 
Section) which approved management responsibility for asset(s) but has no prop-
erty rights to assets as they are the property of the organization. All information 
assets should have a nominated owner (‘an individual or entity that has approved 
management responsibility for the assets’) and should be accounted for. (Calder and 
Watkins 2008).
Assets ownership helps in risk assessment process as owners plays the role of 
custodian where he/she need to be informed before any changes made to asset. 
Acceptable use are set of rules and controls made to control access to certain asset 
such as read, edit, print, email, copy, backup, fax, internet usage and using of orga-
nization’s mobile phones. Acceptable use addresses employee use of the organiza-
tion’s resources for accessing the information, transmitting or receiving electronic 
mail, general use of software, and system access (Landoll 2006).
 Threats and Vulnerabilities
Threats and vulnerabilities are considered to be the main source of risk, there is no 
system that is 100% secure. A threat is the potential for a particular threat-source to 
successfully exercise a particular vulnerability (Stoneburner et al. 2002). The poten-
tial for a “threat source” to exploit (intentional) or trigger (accidental) a specific 
vulnerability (Stoneburner et al. 2002) are:
• Threats usually caused by ‘threat source’ where the last can be caused by human 
or nature, it can be deliberate as in hackings, cyber attacks or accidents as human 
errors, neglecting and lack of training.
• Risk does not occur when a threat source finds no vulnerability,
Threat is the potential to cause damage and harm to organization asset(s), or the 
reasons behind threats to occur, example of threat source is a human which might 
cause harm to an asset though computer attacks and unauthorized access.
A threat-source is defined as any circumstance or event with the potential to 
cause harm to an IT system (Stoneburner et al. 2002). Breaking threats into cate-
gories helps to understand them deeper and identify their threat source. The likeli-
hood of threats to occur is considered as important as threat themselves, some 
threats might impact once a year while others every hour, this parameter 









































(Probability of Occurrence or Likelihood of Occurrence or Likelihood 
Determination) is to be considered in risk evaluation and assessment.
The terms “Likelihood threat occurrence” or “The probability of threat to occur” 
are both used to identify the number of times threats might occur. Such information 
can be gathered from threats surveys, historical system attacks and other source of 
threats. Based on references (Harris 2008) and (Tan 2002) both qualitative and 
quantitative risk analysis uses these indicators in risk assessment. Vulnerabilities are 
weakness in organization security or can be considered as gap that threats can pen-
etrate causing impacts on its assets and business (Stephens and Valverde 2013).
It can “leave a system, or asset, open to attacks by something that is classified 
as a threat, or allow an attack to have some success or greater impact” (Calder and 
Watkins 2008).Vulnerabilities can also be defined as situations and gaps that if not 
controlled or maintained will cause an actual threat. With the fast growing of tech-
nology and the demand of new software, threats will always find vulnerable entity 
or area to practice its impacts and attack. Vulnerability sources could be technical, 
initiated by human or process. The following could be a good source of 
vulnerability:
• Previous risk assessment
• Vendor’s bugs list and reports
• Previous Incident reports generated by helpdesk system (if exist)
• Quality control testing documents
• Scanning tools and conducting penetration test.
 Impact Analysis
Impact is the volume of damage that result from uncontrolled threat; impact can be 
estimated and predicted even before it occurs, where it can effect organization’s 
business, operations and even reputation. Measuring impact is a major step in risk 
assessment, it aims to measure impact volume against asset’s confidentiality, integ-
rity and availability (CIA) through identifying impact’s magnitude and source and 
investigating organization’s sensitive and critical information, as a result impact 
analysis should assign a weight to impact where risk values is to be calculated. IT 
Governance-ISO27001 refers to Impact as “The successful exploitation of vulner-
ability by a threat will have an impact on the asset’s availability, confidentiality or 
integrity”. These impacts should all be identified and, wherever possible, assigned a 
monetary value based on the cost to the organization of that attribute being compro-
mised” (Calder and Watkins 2008).
Impact can result in damaging and delaying of the following:
• Organization’s every day operations.
• Financial loses which results in loss of assets and liabilities.
• Organization’s reputation which is considered a major threat.








































Impacts that affects assets can vary in magnitude, it is very important to under-
stand and measure the amount of damage a certain impact might cause to systems 
and services, and how much time and money will be lost and more important is how 
many times the impact will occur (Likelihood of occurrence/(ARO)). A fast way to 
explore threats impacts is by identify their critical business processes (related to 
their core business). Failure of these processes will cause a critical and vital damage 
to organization.
 Controls
They are set of measurements, activities applied to eliminate, minimize or transfer 
threats.
“Means of managing risk, including policies, procedures, guidelines, practices, 
or organizational structures, which can be administrative, technical, management, 
or legal in nature” (Kouns and Minoli 2010). ISC2 a leaders in information technol-
ogy describes types of controls as following (Table 3.1):
Controls also can be implementing sets of operations and procedures to improve 




This research used a case study research method where data was collected from 
primary and secondary data sources. A case study “involves the investigation of a 
particular situation, problem, company or group of companies” (Dawson 2009). 
Secondary data, or supporting data, was collected from related books, journals, on- 
line articles, vendors’ websites and technology news websites. The case study used 
for this research is the statistics data center of Dubai.
The design of this study is based on well know risk management methodologies,
Table 3.1 Controls types
Control type
Detective Capable to detect threats like IPS, CCTV
Directive Administrative tasks and policies
Preventive Prevent threat to occur like IPS, firewall
Corrective Identify and minimize threat’s impacts like applying security policy
Recovery Controls that associated with disaster recovery and business continuity 
processes



































 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST in their Risk Management 
Guide for Information Technology System describes a full Risk Management 




• Evaluation and Assessment
 2. IT Governance, A manager’s Guide to Data Security and ISO 27001/ISO 27002 
is based on well defined activates supported by template documents which can 
be modified to fit any organization’s Information Security Management System 
ISMS requirements, it is based on the following:
• Gap Analysis
• Identify criticality: the relationships between assets and Objectives
• Identify potential threats and vulnerabilities (likelihood)
• Risk Treatment Plan and the selection of controls and statement of 
applicability
• Measures of Effectiveness
Based on NIST 800-30 best practices the following figure illustrates risk assess-
ment processes describing inputs and outputs entries (Fig. 3.1).
 Information Gathering Methods and Tools
When gathering data, it is quite important to define WHAT is to be collected, and 
WHO are the involved entities and parties in this process and HOW to collect data.
Before starting the risk assessment, it is important to identify what is to be 
collected. The following is to be considered:
• Assets data (types, Categories, Classifications, Owners, History data)
• Threats and Vulnerabilities (details description, categories, sources, types, remedy 
actions, number of occurrences)
• Impacts (details of threats impacts)
• Controls information (description types such as asset, plan, process, prices)
As part of the data collection requirements, it is important to identify the people 
that can help to speed the process of data gathering as hearing their opinions from 
different points of views (technical and business) and blend them in one container 
will help to discover many hidden issues. The process emphasizes on carrying a 
sequence of interviews with asset’s owners, stakeholders, technical teams and risk 
related organization’s members; The interview itself can result in an incredible 
amount of information if it is conducted properly (Landoll 2006).
The following stakeholders and organization’s staff are involved in this 
process:
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• System and network Administrators
• Database Administrators
• Information Security specialist/Officer
• Business Owners
• Risk Manager/Team (if available)
• Financial Manager
• Top Management
Conducting an interview is considered to be an effective way of data gathering, 
it allows direct interaction with stakeholders, technical staff and top management, 




























read their impression and understand their concerns not to mention the short time 
invested in this process. When conducting an interview, it is possible to address any 
confusion immediately, which minimizes the time lost and the frustration experi-
enced by both sides (Wheeler 2011). Interviews to key personnel help to determine 
their ability to perform their duties (as stated in policies), their implementation of 
duties not stated in policies, and observations or concerns they have with current 
security controls” (Landoll 2006).
Questionnaire is just a passive version of an interview (Wheeler 2011). 
Questionnaires must be designed in a smart way to cover all to risk assessment pro-
cess requirements that can be considered as a good input to the risk database for this 
research. The development of a set of interview questions depends heavily on the 
security risk assessment method, scope, and budget being applied (Landoll 2006).
All surveys and questionnaires are designed based on Dubai Statistic Center 
working environment and based on best practices of: Calder and Watkins (2008) 
and Stoneburner et al. (2002).
Proposed templates, questionnaires and interviews with stakeholders and techni-
cal team are to be completed and approved by top management. The following 
templates are to be used
 (i) Collecting Assets Information using:
 (a) Assets Classification and Categorization Template.
 (b) Assets Information Details from Inventory System.
 (ii) Collecting threats and vulnerabilities Information using “General Threats 
Identification Sheet”
 (iii) Collecting existing controls using: “Controls” template
 (iv) Collecting Impact Analysis details using:
 (a) Qualitative Risk Assessment Template
 (b) Quantitative risk assessment templates
 Qualitative Risk Assessment Methodology or Approach
In order to scale assets not based on its marketing value but on its importance to the 
organization, interviews with business owners were conducted and templates evalu-
ated by related members. The following Table 3.2 describes how assets are evalu-
ated based on business sensitivity’s best practices at Dubai Statistic Center.
There are other parameters govern assets values which need to be considered 
also when rating an asset (Table 3.3).
Considering the above information and feedback from interviews and question-
naires the following rating is considered (Table 3.4):
Besides assets’ data threats information must be well identified and collected in 
order to correctly weight their impact values. Threats must be identified, classified 
by category, and evaluated to calculate their damage potential to the company 








































(Harris 2008). Based on best practices at Dubai Statistic Center threats data can be 
gathered from the following sources:
• Historical systems attacks
• World wide data
• Surveys and Questionnaires
Threat’s historical data can be a good reference to organization’s Information 
Security procedures, it can shows systems and services historical failures and what 
are the measures taken (if exist) to protect against such threats. This can be treated 
as the starting point of threats gathering. Threat probability of occurrence can never 
be 100% accurate after all it is not easy to predict when the next attack will be, 
however, giving a weight to threat’s likelihood of occurrence can lead to better 




Assets involved in core business, stalling or losing them will compromise 
organization CIA and would result in severe impact and losses such as financial 
and reputation wise which is unacceptable.




Any assets that are not part of core business and do not cause a threat to the 
organization image, impact can be bearable and acceptable
Example attendance system, development server and others similar.
Low value 
asset
Loosing or staling such assets would not compromise organization’s CIA and 
would result in miner disruption
Example printer, scanner, telephone device and others similar.
Table 3.3 Other parameters effecting assets
Asset parameter Description
Assets dependency level Referencing asset’s hierarchy and relationship with 
other assets. Is the asset depending on other assets? 
(application installed on app server)
Does it have children (dependencies)?
The more children an asset has, the higher its value as 
other assets depends on it. (server that hosts different 
software and data bases should worth more to the 
organization than a server with a single software that 
is installed on it)
Assets access level/classifications What is the classification level for this asset?
Is it top classified where losing the asset will damage 
the organization’s reputation or it is public and can be 
compromised?
Asset age Represent the number of years that the asset is 
operating.
Conclusion: in order to assign a value 
to asset (high, medium, and low) the 
above parameters are to be considered.
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determination of risk value. The likelihood that a potential vulnerability could be 
exercised by a given threat-source can be described as high, medium, or low 
(Stoneburner et al. 2002). Based on meetings results with Risk Manager and refer-
encing NIST SP-800-30 (Stoneburner et al. 2002), threats likelihood of occurrence 
can be measured as following (Table 3.5):
Identifying the common well known threats is an easy way to start collecting 
threat information. Table 3.6 presents common threats data that can exist at most of 
IT departments.
It would be better to identify major threats over major assets to save time and 
efforts. Based on asset value to organization and interviews conducted with (Risk 
Manager, asset’s owners), this research measured the impact volume according to 
its power to stole business or interrupt it. Referencing NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner 
et al. 2002) and based on the Dubai Statistic Center, business sensitivity in the 
following Table 3.7 illustrates impact volume measurement.






Table 3.5 Probability or likelihood of threat to occur
Likelihood of threats occurrence Description Weight
Negligible Unlikely to occur
Very low Might occur few times every 5 years
Low Like to occur once every year 0.1
Medium Occurs once every 6 months 0.5
High Occur multiple times per month 1
Very high Multiple times every week
Extreme More than once every day
Table 3.6 General threats list
Threat
Probability  
of occurrence Existing control Applicable assets Owner












Power failure High UPS
Generators
Data Center Operation section










































Based on the previous table, impact values can be presented as following 
(Table 3.8):
This approach is based on giving a weight value to each asset, threat’s impacts 
and their likelihood of occurrences as (High, Medium and Low). Risk is calculated 
in the proposed risk database as follows (Harris 2008):
 Risk Asset Value Impact Likelihood of Threat= × ×  (3)
 Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodology
In order to gather monetary risk values where assets values are measured in cur-
rency, the finance manager and involved team in asset evaluation are to fill a 
Quantitative Risk assessment questionnaire. Based on interviews with Assets 




• Development Cost (in case of Application Software)
• Installation and Configuration Value
• Maintenance and Support Cost
• Replacement Cost
• Operation and running Cost (electricity, License in case of software)
• Depreciation Cost
Table 3.7 Impact volume Measurements based on NIST SP 800-30
Impact volume Description
Insignificant Almost no impact if threat and vulnerabilities are exploited
Minor Minor effects on organization’s assets and business, recovering is manageable
Significant Results in some tangible damage, and require some time to recover (example 
internal service interruption and restored, connection down restored 
immediately)
Damaging Noticeable impact that result in large but internal damage, requires time and 
resources to restore (example internal operation failure)
Critical The impact could result in high damage of business infrastructure which 
result total failure to deliver business and require long time and high 
resources to restore (example production server failure, network down)
Critical High H 3
Damaging Medium M 2
Minor Low L 1
Table 3.8 Impact values





































• Value to organization (like Organization Reputation)
• Asset value to users and customers
Based on previous assets parameters provided, the following formula can be gen-
erated and used to set quantitative value to asset.
 
Asset Value Purchasing Value Depreciation value cost of t= − + ( ime to
recover or cost to replace asset and put it to functioning) + loss caused by
service stopping Support and Maintenance value+  
(4)
The exposure factor (EF) represents the percentage of loss a realized threat could 
have on a certain asset (Harris 2008; Kouns and Minoli 2010). Single Loss 
Expectancy (SLE) is the total amount of revenue that is lost from a single occur-
rence of the risk (Kouns and Minoli 2010). Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO) is the 
normalized rate at which the risk exposure resulting in actual damage occurs during 
1 year (Kouns and Minoli 2010).
The annualized rate of occurrence (ARO) is the value that represents the esti-
mated frequency of a specific threat taking place within a one-year timeframe 
(Harris 2008). Qualitative risk is based on assigning monetary value to assets. Based 
on Harris (2008), Tan (2002) and Wheeler (2011) the quantitative risk formula in 
the proposed risk database is calculated as below:
Single Loss Expectancy SLE Asset Value Exposure Factor EF( ) = (∗ )
( ) = ×Annual Loss Expectancy ALE SLE Annual Rate of Occurrence ARO( )  (5)
Data for the proposed dashboard viewer can be presented as:
• Charts
• Tables
The proposed study case template to analyze risk data is presented below in 
Table 3.9.
Table 3.9 A proposed study case template to analyze risk data and propose action
Case #
Name The case description or the criteria title
Indicators How this case was explored? What are the risk indicators?
Effective parameters What are the related parameters?
Example asset value, impact value.
Searching criteria What is the searching criteria, what to look for and where?
Analysis and 
investigation
This section covers analyzing the case (HOW?) and what indication 
we need to build our decision on?
Decision and action Decision and action need to be taken.


































 Case Study and Data Collection
In order to present risk data accurately at any organization, the risk team must have 
a full picture over organization’s main services and its backbone infrastructure 
where every asset (tangible and none) software and hardware is identified. The 
above figure demonstrates an IT based service with four VLANs (Virtual Local 
Area Network) similar to the environment of the Dubai Statistic Center and its com-
ponents of hardware and software as they are described in details in Fig. 3.2.
A good understanding of the organization structure leads to a better identification 
of threats and vulnerabilities areas. The risk team can develop a solid idea on how 
to plan risk management processes, contacting whom in case of failure, which 
departments and sections will be out of business in case of threat’s impact and what 
are the losses.
Figure 3.3 represents part of the Dubai Statistic Center’s Departments 
Organization Chart. Top management approval must be granted before initiating a 
risk assessment process, the following should be considered:

































• All related stakeholders are to be notified.
• All proposed templates, questionnaires and interviews scenarios are to be 
checked and approved.
• Business owners and technical staff are to be notified.
• Checking that the inventory system is up to date and contains all assets information 
required for the assessment.
The following lists all templates and sheets descriptions used for data collection.
• Assets Inventory and Classification List
• Threat Information Collection Form
• Controls
• Qualitative Risk Assessment data
• Quantitative Risk assessment data
As a result of top management and stakeholder’s approval of proposed templates, 
all questionnaires and Templates were distributed to related sections and individuals. 
Also, interviews should be conducted with related department members and managers.
 Assets Information Identification
The first step in assets gathering is to collect assets’ data based on its importance to 
the organization where assets’ type, nature, mean of storage, owner and access 






















Fig. 3.3 Dubai Statistic Center Organization chart




















In this step, the boundaries of the IT system are identified, along with the resources 
and the information that constitute the system (Stoneburner et al. 2002).
The second step is to collect assets’ information based on its logistic storage 
where assets’ details are to be recorded like serial No#, brand, maintenance contract 
details and others. The logistic information is easy to get from any assets inventory 
system or Configuration Management Database CMDB.  Collected data can be 
pushed later to a risk database depending on how the organization plans to automate 
this process (Fig. 3.4).
Based on the above template and the Dubai Statistic Center Infrastructure in 




• Acceptable Use and many
• Asset Classification
The required risk information and data are collected and coded using the pro-
posed excel sheets as to be used later to feed the risk database. Figure 3.5 shows the 
excel sheet for asset information.




































 Collecting Controls Information
An interview to technical and business staff can help to identify what controls cur-
rently exists, this process helps the risk the team to highlight the current available 
countermeasures. Based on best practices and interviews conducted with related 
members and business owners, the following proposed template in Fig. 3.6 is used 
to gather existing controls applied to certain assets
Fig. 3.5 Asset information after coding








































 Collecting Controls Information
Based on the risk formula and previous data collected via assets, threats and con-
trols templates, the following table is produced with risk values against assets before 
and after the proposed controls (Fig. 3.7).
 Collecting Quantitative Risk Data
Based on risk formula and previous data collected via assets, values, threats and 
expected loss factors, a table with risk values in Fig. 3.8 illustrates the calculation of 
risk values against asset before and after proposed control.
The template gathers assets information based on asset’s financial cost to 
organization, the calculation formula can be complex and vary from asset to 
another.
Fig. 3.7 Qualitative risk assessment













































 Collecting Quantitative Risk Data
Threats data can be collected using surveys and from historical incidents. Software 
logs if interpreted and reformatted can be another good source of threats, they can 
show what is the real infrastructure and what are the technical threats surrounding 
the organization. When it comes to security, these logs can be a good reference for 
vulnerability and penetration test as well. Other advantage of using system’s log is 
to achieve real time views; risk database can log/accept data from various incident 
sources. Incident Management Systems and SysLog can be a good example for 
best practice. The following Figs. 3.9 and 3.10 presents electronic threats sources 
to risk database.
 Design and Build Risk Database
The database design includes entities that define risk processes, attributes which 
constructs each entity and relationship between entities.




Going further by breaking down the entities into sub entities based on collected 
data. The following Table  3.10 illustrates the major database tables proposed to 
present risk data. The table also describes the functionality and purposes behind 
each database table.
This approach is more practical for some organizations while it is not for others 
but it is still easier and requires less calculation. It is based on surveys and question-
naires provided and it is more achievable when it comes to rate similar hardware 























































this figure will be printed in b/w
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that exists in two different businesses (example a Server can be rated as HIGH when 
it comes to production environment while the same Server can be rated as LOW if 
it is used for training purposes). Table 3.11 presents the risk formula calculation in 
the risk database based on a qualitative approach.
Table 3.10 Database tables
Tables Description
Services This is the master table that most of the organizations assets is linked to, 
since any organization has mission and vision to provide the specified 
services
Asset _Information Master table that contain all required data required about all IT assets to 
control and monitor at real-time risks such as: Asset id, description, type, 
subtype, category, value to organization, age which involved directly in 
calculating the current risk to assets.
Other data manages the yearly maintenance contracts, location, disposal 
methods, and item status if it is active or canceled (write-off).
One the fields is Ast_ID dependency which relates the item to its 
dependencies such as if a server is at risk.
Assets_types Assets types can be information, paper, hard copy, physical, people.




As in Table 3.1 assets access level
Threats_info Table of threats information, threat_ID which will be used as reference for 
the threat in the database, detailed description of the threat, category 
(human, technical..), subcategory (power failure..), impact scale (high, 
medium..), access level (top confidential, mangers, section heads) what is 
the best remedy, and the person or dept. in charge.
Threats_History Table of threats occurrence history, contains all threats history impacting 
organization and what was the remedy? Who recovered? And the severity 
level with the damages caused.
The history will be used for data mining that will be displayed if any of 
the risks occurrences exceeds our expectation and should we add more 
controls of assets.
RAP_Threat_m Risk assessment plan master table, which has only the final accumulative 
risk for all assets items after implementing controls.
RAP_Threat_D1 A detail table to store all possible threats for each asset and values to 
organization, impact, possible occurrence and calculated risk used to 
calculate final accumulative risk.
RAP_Threat_D2 A detailed table to store all the controls used to mitigate threats risk’s 
which is stored at RAP_Threat_D1, impact after implementing the 
control, new possible occurrence and the calculated risk, control status if it 
is proposed or implemented, or canceled
Threats_Controls A tables to store all used or proposed controls with a reference, 
description and type of control, since it mostly as asset item also or a new 
business procedure or new plan.
Ast_access_Level Assets access level as the standard code used to determine the access level 
to the asset item (top management, manger, head section, inside the 
organization, or public), it is used mainly for sensitive documents such 
contract, financial data, and any assets that has limited access only.


















































A monetary value presentation of assets, threats and risk, for those who seeks 
financial numbers can use the Quantitative values which is part of the risk database. 
Table 3.12 shows threats and their single Loss Expectancies, Annual Rate of threat’s 
Occurrences and Annual Loss Expectancies.
 Dashboard and Risk Analysis
A dashboard viewer can provide various risk information that can help the risk team 
to determine what action needs to be taken. Actions should be based on decisions 
that’s wisely reflects the risk volume and amount of damage that can result.
Three risk scenarios are presented in order to demonstrate the risk dashboard 
generation for risk management.
 Risk Scenario 1: Threats and Impact Analysis Based 
on Qualitative Approach
Data at the proposed dashboard viewer can be presented as:
• Charts
• Tables
Table 3.13 describes the risk scenario 1 that is meant to find high risk based on 
threat’s impact by using a qualitative approach. The risk manager in this case is 
Table 3.11 Qualitative risk dependencies and calculation method in the proposed database
Risk dependency Calculation method
Asset qualitative value
AST_QLTV_VALUE
In qualitative approach asset is rated as (HIGH, 
MEDIUM, LOW) and rated as follows 
HIGH = 3, MEDIUM = 2, LOW = 1)
Threat impact after controls are applied
THREAR_AFC_QLTV_IMPACT
Impact value, can be (HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW) 
and rated as follows HIGH = 3, MEDIUM = 2, 
LOW = 1)
Probability of threat to occur or take place it 
can also be called as the likelihood of threat 
to occur.
THREAT_AFC_QLTV_PROB
The frequency of threat to occur
LOW—Occurs once every few years and rated 
as 0.1
MEDIUM- occurs once every 6 months and 
rated as 0.5
HIGH- occurs once every month and can be 
rated as 1
Qualitative risk (calculated value)
THREAT_AFC_QLTV_RISK
Risk is calculated in the proposed database 
using qualitative approach as follows:
RISK = ASSET value * impact value * 
probability of occurrence





































Table 3.12 Quantitative risk dependencies and calculation method
Formula
Asset quantitative value 
(AST_QNTV_VALUE)




Cost of recovery/replacement time
Delay and stepping time cost
Ast_Qntv_value = Purchasing value - depreciation value +(cost of 
time to recover) or cost to replace asset and put it to functioning + 
loss caused by service stopping + support and maintenance cost
Single loss expectancy 
(calculated value)
Is the quantitative asset 
value multiplied by 
exposure factor
Single loss expectancy (SLE) is calculated by multiplying asset 
quantitative value (calculated in the previous row) by threat 
exposure factor (EF-the percentage of loss a threat can have over an 
asset).
Example: If asset that worth 20 K is exposed to threat that can 
damage 30% of the asset such as partial malfunction then single 
loss expectancy (SLE) = AST_QNTV_VALUE* EF
= 20,000 * 0.3 = 6000$
Annual rate of occurrence
THREAT_AFC_QNTV_
PROB_OCC_ARO
How many time the threat can occur (usually its calculated per 
year)
Value can be between 0 to greater than one
Annual loss expectancy 
(calculated value)
This value can tell the management how much damage in monetary 
value can certain threat annually cause to a certain asset, in other 
word it is the SLE multiplied by ARO =
AST_QNTV_VALUE * THREAT_AFC_QNTV_EF * THREAT_
AFC_QNTV_PROB_OCC_ARO
Table 3.13 Scenario 1
Scenario # 1
Name Finding high risk based on threat’s impacts/qualitative approach






Searching criteria Looking for assets or systems with:
High impact value and low likelihood of occurrence
High impact value and high likelihood of occurrence
Analysis and 
investigation
All high impacts values must be taken seriously; IT staff might 
underestimate risks with low likelihood of occurrence as they might never 
occur.
Example an out of date antivirus on database server, it is a fact that most of 
database servers are located in a separate VLAN which is isolated from 
external traffic and the probability of virus attack is very unlikely to occur 
but that does not mean it is safe to leave the antivirus software out of date. 
The impact will be very high if the server is attacked.
Decision and 
action
All high impact values are to be seriously considered even with low 
probability of occurrence.
An immediate action is to be taken for any high impact assets even if the 
probability of attack was very unlikely to occur.


















































looking for assets or systems with high impact value and low likelihood of occur-
rence or high impact value and high likelihood of occurrence.
The results are presented in the dashboard view in Fig. 3.11.
 Risk Scenario 2: Decisions Based on Historical Risk Data
Risk historical data can be a good source for decision makers and risk analysts for 
the planning of risk mitigation strategies. The risk database through dashboard 
views can help to make a better picture of the nature and types of threats for frequent 
attacks and their business impact. Based on the analysis of the dashboard, an analyst 
can decide if an action needs to be taken towards this risk and to whether add more 
controls and propose prevention actions or just accept the risk.
Based on the historical table in Risk Database the (qualitative and quantitative 
view) risk values can shows increases of risk through years as seen in Fig. 3.12.
Retrieved data filtered by threat number 25 (Unauthorized access), shows that 
this threat’s impact is increasing over the years (2009, 2010, 2011) as indicated in 
the dashboard view in Fig. 3.13.
Figure 3.14 shows a dashboard view that indicates that IBM SAN Storage, MS 
Exchange Server and Oracle Database server are subject to “Unauthorized Access”. 
This threat is increasing every year.









Fig. 3.11 Dashboard view – high risk based on threat’s impacts/qualitative approach




















































 Risk Scenario 3: Risk Views at CRM Service Level
The Risk database can provide risk views at the service level (example CRM) 
where all related assets risk values are added as a sum as shown in Fig.  3.15 
(Table 3.14).







Years  of monitoring
Quantaive Risk







Fig. 3.14 Dashboard view—annual increases of Asset’s risk- chart view
Service CRM Risk






























































Based on the previous analysis and investigation to “unauthorized access”, a new 
control is proposed and the next figure illustrates the risk level after the new control 
is applied (Purchasing IPS) (Fig. 3.16).
The above figure and based on quantitative risk analysis shows drop in risk level 
to 1000$, 2400$ and 3400$ to IBM SAN Storage, Email Server and Oracle Server 
respectfully at 2011 and after new control is applied (Fig. 3.17).
The above figure and based on qualitative risk analysis shows drop in risk level 
to 0.9, 0.4 and 0.9 to IBM SAN Storage, Email Server and Oracle Server respect-
fully at 2011 and after new control is applied.
Table 3.14 Scenario 3
Case 3
Area Risk
Name Service level risk per threat based on historical data
Indicators Monitoring risk level
Effective 
parameters





Searching criteria Risk generated by threat number 25 (unauthorized access) since 2009 till 2011
Analysis and 
investigation
The retrieved data helps risk analysts and security specialists to determine 
the amount of risk generated by threat 25 since 2009, it indicates as the 
dashboard shows that the unauthorized access is increases on the related 
assets (SAN storage, email and database server).
Decision and 
action
An action need to be taken to protect CRM service
Purchasing IPS would be a good solution providing that two out of three 
assets are rated HIGH (3) which considered important to be protected.
Impact value is HIGH (3) for two out of three asset.
As a conclusion high level asset with high level impact value is to be 
considered seriously.
















































As a result CRM service Level risk is dropped to reach level less than what was 
in 2009 as shown in Fig. 3.18.
 Conclusions
The calculation of total risk at a statistics data center based on qualitative and 
quantitative analysis is possible using the proposed database that will give decision 
makers a good insight in order to make better decisions before and when threats hit 
the organization. Predicting threats before they happen by conducting a what if 
analysis on the infrastructure and calculate the expected risk, take the propriety 
action as preventing threat from happening or mitigate risk before it happens is 
possible with a help of a dashboard in a statistics data center. Presenting the risk 
Fig. 3.17 Dashboard view—Qntv-risk dropped in 2011 to acceptable level-chart and tabular view













































Table 3.15 Advantage of risk database
Process
Manual and semi 





template forms to feed 
manual and automated 
processes
Use ITIL CMDB as reference or consider 
the risk database a good assets repository/
inventory which can serve and feed other 







attacks) that is collected 
periodically from 
different systems and 
resources
Well known attacks by 
vendors
A full threat’s repository for the current 
existing threats and expected ones based 
on assets nature vulnerabilities.
Automated display (dashboard viewer) for 
all possible threats, discovery details and 
existing and proposed controls
Risk mitigation Qualitative OR 
quantitative approach.
Risk evaluated at asset 
level only
Manual or systematic 
way of calculation with 
restriction
Risk evaluation and calculation in both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches; 
gives a wide range of evaluation criteria 
and better understanding of risk
A service/system level risk view, with 
drilling capability to asset level.
Automated risk calculation and flexible 
way to change calculation parameters
Presentation layer Manuals and hardcopy 
documents
Complicated and very 
expensive systems
Dashboard viewer that reads directly from 
the proposed database and required no 
application.
level on a dashboard viewer makes risk level clearer for a decision maker. The model 
created with the help of managers, head section, risk officers, helpdesk (risk stake-
holder) of a statistics data center assisted in the creation of a tool to follow-up risk 
management since the time it hits till the time of mitigation, and it will give a clear 
picture for a manager on how subordinates are performing. Historical risk data is 
considered to be a good and rich source to threats and impacts that surrounds the 
statistics data center organization. Decisions can be built based on legacy informa-
tion to provide better protection and controls can minimize manual activities and 
paper work. Manual work can be a hectic activity as it depends on various entities 
and individuals; accuracy and consistency might be an issue, collecting and filtering 
information requires lots of efforts and man hours. The following Table  3.15 
describes the advantages of a risk database over manual activities:
Finally, a risk database is a good resource for top management to build their 
conclusions based on collected data and take the proper action against risks at the right 
time. The senior manager must decide to reduce the risk, accept the risk, or delegate 
the risk to someone else. A security risk can be reduced by implementing additional 
security controls or even by improving existing security controls (Landoll 2006).
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